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Does crisis affect convergence process? The case of the Spanish provinces 
 
Abstract 
We study the possible existence of convergence across the Spanish provinces, 
paying special attention to the influence the recent international crisis has had on 
this process. To this end, we have taken the traditional per capita GDP as well as 
the multidimensional index of human development as a reference. Our results 
show that the convergence pattern has been clearly modified by the crisis; the 
differences are greater in 2014 than in 2007. Nevertheless, a greater effect of the 
crisis has not been observed on predominantly urban provinces, in contrast to 
what other authors have found in the case of Europe.  
Keywords: Convergence; Human Development Index; Urban provinces; Crisis. 




The study of economic convergence has recently received a great deal of attention from 
applied economic researchers because it is a good way of assessing whether economies have 
diminished their disparities. After the seminal papers of BARRO et al., 1991, and BARRO 
and SALA-I-MARTÍ, 1992, who based their results on the use of cross-sectional techniques, 
some authors such as CARLINO and MILLS, 1993, CARLINO and MILLS, 1996, 
BERNARD and DURLAUF, 1995, EVANS and KARRAS, 1996, LOEWY and PAPELL, 
1996, NAHAR and INDER, 2002, STRAZICICH et al., 2004, and CARRIÓ-I-SILVESTRE 
and SOTO, 2007, amongst many others, have addressed the issue of economic convergence 
by studying the stochastic properties of some macroeconomic aggregates. The use of different 
unit root tests leads these authors to find mixed evidence about whether economies are 
converging and about the speed of convergence. 
All these papers base their results on the use of the regional per capita GDP as the most 
appropriate indicator of the situation in a particular economy. We should note, however, that 
the per capita GDP cannot capture some interesting aspects related to human welfare and 
economic potential, including health, education and social integration. Consequently, it seems 
to be sensible to consider the use of multidimensional indexes in order to assess the evolution 
of a particular region or country, especially if the current economic environment is based on 
the application of austerity policies that affect education or health care, among others. An 
interesting index is the Human Development Index (HDI), which has been published since 
1990 by the United Nations Development Programme in its annual Human Development 
Report. This index provides information about the capacities of a particular economy and not 
about realizations as the simple GDP. Consequently, the HDI can offer alternative results in 
the analysis of convergence among groups of economies. 
An example of the use of this index to test for convergence is the recent paper by 
MONTAÑÉS and OLMOS, 2014. These authors compare the results of the convergence 
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analysis for the Spanish regions when both GDP and HDI are used. Two main results emerge 
from that paper. First, the results obtained from the use of GDP and HDI exhibit some 
differences at the end of the sample (2000), but they tend to show similar results at the 
beginning of the sample. Consequently, this result invites us to use both variables to analyze 
convergence, given its marked complementary relationship. Secondly, the evolution of the 
Spanish regions can be better understood as the addition of some divergent patterns of 
behavior rather than the presence of a real convergence process, suggesting the existence of 
some convergence clubs, an interesting question that the authors cannot solve using the unit 
root techniques. Nevertheless, the sample used by these authors covers the period from 1980-
2010. Therefore, the total effects of the economic crisis that Spain has suffered since 2008, 
like the rest of the economies, cannot be properly assessed and that could have had an impact 
on the aforementioned convergence process. It is possible that the crisis may have increased 
the differences and, therefore, the diverging behaviors have worsened, or, on the other hand, 
that the distances have been reduced. In any case, there is no information on the impact of the 
crisis on the convergence process and, consequently, it seems appropriate to analyze the 
behavior of Spain over this period. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to 
analyze the influence of the recent economic crisis on the convergence process in Spain. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the database. Section 3 
presents the methodology that will be employed in the paper and the results obtained from the 
convergence analysis. Section 4 explores the sources that generate the different clubs of 
behavior. The paper ends with a review of the most important insights. 
2. The effect of the crisis on the Spanish provinces: data and descriptive 
analysis 
As we have previously stated, the objective of this paper is to analyze whether the recent 
international crisis has affected in some way the convergence process in the Spanish 
provinces. Therefore, it is necessary to decide on which variable to study in the convergence 
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process since we can employ different measurements on the evolution of a particular 
province. Most of the previous convergence papers are based on the use of the per capita 
GDP. Nevertheless, this measurement can hide the effect on other essential aspects of the 
evolution of a society, especially if we take into account that the provincial, regional and 
central governments have taken austerity measures aimed at reducing the deficit of the public 
administrations, which consequently has had restrictive effects on public health and 
education. Subsequently, it is foreseeable that the crisis has altered not only the levels of 
economic wellbeing, but also health and education attained since the 1980s. Thus, it seems 
advisable to use an indicator that takes into account these three aspects: material wellbeing, 
health and education, as is the case with the well-known Human Development Index (HDI).  
This index is based on the idea of Amartya Sen of reflecting capabilities and opportunities 
more than realizations (see SEN, 1985). Its definition has recently changed and the current 
version of this index can be stated as follows: 
      ܪܦܫ௜௧ = ඥܪܫ௜௧ ∗ ܧܫ௜௧ ∗ ܯܹܫ௜௧య 							ݐ = 1,2, … ,ܰ      (1) 
where ܪܫ, ܧܫ and ܯܹܫ mean a Health Index, an Education Index and a Material Wellbeing 
Index, respectively. The ܪܫ depends on the life expectancy at birth (ܮܧ) and is defined as 
follows: 
      ܪܫ௜௧ = ௅ா೔೟ି୫୧୬௅ா୫ୟ୶௅ாି୫୧୬௅ா          (2) 
with min ܮܧ and max ܮܧ being equal to 20 and 85 years, respectively. The education index is 
obtained as follows: 
  ܧܫ௜௧ = ெ௒ௌூ೔೟ାா௒ௌ೔೟ଶ                 (3) 
where ܯܻܵܫ represents mean years of schooling index (ܯܻܵ) and ܧܻܵ is the expected years 
of schooling index. These indexes are obtained as follows: 
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  ܯܻܵܫ௜௧ = ெ௒ௌ೔೟ଵହ                 (4) 
                                                             ܧܻܵܫ௜௧ = ா௒ௌ೔೟ଵ଼                         (5) 
Finally, ܯܹܫ is an income index that can be defined as follows: 
           ܯܹܫ௜௧ = ୪୬(ீேூ೔೟)ି୪୬(ଵ଴଴)୪୬(଻ହ,଴଴଴೔೟)ି୪୬(ଵ଴଴)              (6) 
where ܩܰܫ௜௧ is the Gross National Income of each i-th province at period t. 
Throughout this paper we will combine the use of the more standard per capita GDP with the 
use of the HDI that, in our view, can help us better understand the type of effects that the 
crisis has had on the Spanish convergence process.  
Having defined the variables that we will focus on, the next problem we face is the type of 
territorial disaggregation to be used. In our view, it seems advisable to use the most 
disaggregated information as possible, whenever data permits. Combining both premises, it 
seems appropriate to use provincial data (which is equivalent to the TL3 used by the OECD or 
to the NUTS-3 defined by Eurostat).  It is true that the majority of papers usually use less 
disaggregated data, as is the case of a regional analysis.  However, we should take into 
account that the use of regional data may not sometimes provide very useful insights. Here we 
are considering those cases where the regional division includes infra-regional territorial 
structures, such as provinces or cities that behave heterogeneously. Given that the regional 
data is a weighted average of all of them, the conclusions based on regional data cannot be 
very informative. This is clear in the Spanish case, where the regional structure is composed 
of a great variety of provinces whose behavior is far from being similar within a region. For 
instance, we can consider the case of Aragon. This region has their main focus of activity on 
the cities of Huesca, Teruel and Zaragoza. The activity in this region is mainly focused on the 
cities of Huesca, Teruel and Zaragoza, which give the name to the three homonymous 
provinces. The population of the city of Zaragoza represents 50% of the population of 
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Aragon, whilst this percentage rises to 72% if we consider the province of Zaragoza. 
Furthermore, the regional productive structure is not similar if we analyze it from a provincial 
perspective. For instance, the weight of the manufacturing industry in Zaragoza almost 
doubles that of Huesca and Teruel. Similarly, the contribution of the Agriculture sector to the 
GDP is clearly higher in Huesca and, to a very lesser extent, in Teruel than in Zaragoza. 
Therefore, the conclusions that emerge from a regional analysis cannot offer insights as rich 
as those obtained from a more disaggregated study, especially as far as the active growth 
policies are concerned. 
Having determined the level of territorial disaggregation, we must address the issue of 
available information. Accordingly, we should point out that the Valencian Institute of 
Economic Research (IVIE) has a long tradition of estimating the values of the HDI for 
Spanish regions and provinces1. We can cite the works of HERRRERO et al., 2010a, 
HERRRERO et al., 2010b, and HERRRERO et al., 2010c, in this regard. However, their data 
are only available until 2010 for the Spanish regions and until 2007 for the Spanish provinces. 
Given that our objective is to assess the influence of the crisis on the convergence process, it 
is necessary to update the HDI values in order to have a post-crisis interval that is large 
enough so as to be able to observe the changes in the convergence trajectories. For this 
reason, the HDI has been obtained for the different Spanish provinces from 1980 to 2014. 
Nevertheless, given that provincial statistics do not have the level of detail that regional 
statistics provide, we have had to make small modifications in the definitions of the partial 
indexes that comprise the HDI. More specifically, we have just considered the value of the 
MYSI in order to obtain the EI, given that the EYS data are not available by province. 
Likewise, and for the same reasons, instead of using the GNI, we have used the provincial 
GDP, using the corresponding CPI as deflator.  
Lastly, it is important to note that, in order to be able to compare the results with previous 
convergence works, we have included the real per capita GDP data in the study, which allows 
us to analyze the convergence process from different perspectives.  
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2. 1. Descriptive analysis 
The values for the Spanish provinces cover the 1980-2014 period and the data source is 
reflected in Appendix A. We should recall at this point that Spain is divided into 50 provinces 
grouped in 17 regions. Additionally, there are two autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla), but 
we have preferred to omit them from the study due to their small dimensions and 
administrative peculiarities. Thus, we will base the study on the abovementioned 50 
provinces. A detailed list of these provinces is displayed in the Appendix B. 
First of all, Table 1 presents the initial and final values of the two measurements we are going 
to use, the per capita GDP and the HDI, as well as its growth rate for the periods 1980-2007, 
2007-2014 and 1980-2014. As we can observe, those provinces with lower initial values are 
those that also have lower final values. To support this statement, it is sufficient to take into 
account that the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient takes the value of 0.91 when the 
1980 and 2007 levels of HDI are compared, and of 0.92 when the values of 1980 and 2014 are 
analyzed. For the per capita GDP the results are similar: 0.92 and 0.94 for the two cases cited. 
Therefore, it seems clear that the provinces that are situated in a lower position at the 
beginning of the sample have not improved significantly with respect to the leaders. 
Nevertheless, a simple analysis of the growth rates of the different provinces permits us to 
observe that those provinces with small initial values have grown more, in general, than those 
with larger values. Furthermore, this is valid for the HDI data as well as the per capita GDP 
data.    
Another interesting way to analyze the data is in terms of the typology of the province.  In 
accordance with the OECD, the TL3 regions, provinces in the Spanish case, are classified into 
Predominantly Urban (PU), Intermediate (INT), Predominantly Rural Close to a city (PRC) 
and Predominantly Rural Remote (PRR) to take into account geographical differences among 
them. This classification is based on population density criteria and on the size of the urban 
centers located within a region. Table 2 shows the average growth rates of this type of 
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province for the three periods in which we have divided the sample. The first result we should 
point out is that the behavior of the PU provinces is similar to that of the INT. There are no 
great differences in the growth rates of these provinces. If we take the per capita GDP as a 
reference, we see that both have a growth rate of over 2.6% until 2007, while the crisis has 
had a remarkable effect on them, decreasing to an annual rate of -2.9%. Something similar 
occurs when we use the HDI, although in this case the growth rates up to 2007 are much more 
modest, less than 1%, and over the period of 2008-2014 the growth rate is practically zero 
without reaching negative numbers.  
The behavior of rural provinces describes a slightly different panorama. Using the per capita 
GDP, we see that the rural provinces grow more than the rest, especially the PRR that exceed 
a growth rate of 3. This growth slows abruptly in the following period; these rural provinces 
show a growth rate inferior to the rest of the provinces, once again especially the PRR. We 
can say something similar when we use the HDI. There are no great differences in the growth 
of this indicator until 2007, even though the PRR show a slightly higher rate. In the period 
following the crisis, the growth rate of the rural provinces is the same as those for the urban 
provinces. In addition, it must be pointed out that the PRR have a lower growth rate (0.22%) 
than the PRC (0.28%). 
This descriptive analysis leads us to reach several conclusions. The first is that there doesn’t 
seem to be a clear convergence pattern between the Spanish provinces, in part due to the great 
distance between them at the beginning of the sample. Therefore, this result gives rise to the 
presence of differentiated behavior clubs, which would confirm that of MONTAÑÉS and 
OLMOS, 2014, in the sense that the evolution of the Spanish economy is more the sum of 
regional divergent processes than the consequence of convergence between the regions.  On 
the other hand, it does not seem that the crisis has affected the different provinces very 
unevenly. Moreover, in contrast to what is found in DIJKSTRA et al., 2015, the urban 
provinces show better growth rates of the per capita GDP in the period from 2008-2014 and 
very similar values with respect to the HDI.  
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In any case, these conclusions have been obtained from a simple descriptive analysis of the 
data. Therefore, it seems to be adequate to use more appropriate techniques to verify whether 
the crisis unleashed in 2007 has had some kind of effect on the convergence process, a 
question that will be addressed in the following section.     
 
3. Testing for convergence: Methodology and results 
This section first discusses the methodology that we have employed for determining the 
presence of convergence. Most previous convergence analyses of the variable ܺ over an 
objective value ܺ∗ have been traditionally based on the study of the presence of a unit root in 
the ratio ln( ௜ܺ௧/ܺ∗), with i=1,2,…,N and t=1,2,...,T reflecting the cross section and sample 
size of the database, respectively. However, we will employ the methodology recently 
proposed in PHILLIPS and SUL, 2007, given that it offers some advantages with respect to 
the standard unit-root based analysis. Furthermore, these authors develop a method for 
detecting the existence of convergence clubs, a quite feasible hypothesis according to the 
results of the previous section. Afterwards, we will report the outcomes that we have 
obtained. 
3.1. Methodology 
We have followed the recent papers of PHILLIPS and SUL, 2007, and PHILLIPS and SUL, 
2009, PS hereinafter, where they develop a very interesting framework to, first, test for the 
convergence hypothesis and, if this is rejected, to analyze the existence of clubs of regions 
that show similar patterns of behavior.  
Following these authors, let us consider that ௜ܺ௧ represents the variable of interest (in the 
present case, the HDI or the per capita GDP) with i=1, 2,…, 50 and t= 1980,…, 2014. This 
variable can be decomposed as ௜ܺ௧ = ߜ௜௧ߤ௧, where ߤ௧ is a common component and ߜ௜௧ is the 
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idiosyncratic one. PS suggest testing for convergence by analyzing whether ߜ௜௧ converges 
towards ߜ. To do so, they first define the relative transition component:  
                                            ℎ௜௧ = ௑೔೟ேషభ 	∑ ௑೔೟೔ಿసభ =
ఋ೔೟
ேషభ 	∑ ఋ೔೟೔ಿసభ
                                                     (7) 
In the presence of convergence, ℎ௜௧  should converge towards unity, whilst its cross-sectional 
variation (ܪ௜௧) should go to 0 when T moves toward infinity, 
                                 ܪ௜௧ = ܰିଵ 	∑ (ℎ௜௧ − 1)ଶே௜ୀଵ → 0				ܽݏ					ܶ → 	∞  (8) 
PS test for convergence by estimating the following equation: 
                 ݈݋݃ ுభு೟ − 2݈݋݃ሾlog(ݐ)ሿ = ߙ + ߚ log(ݐ) + ݑ௧, ݐ = 	 ሾݎܶሿ + 1,… , ܶ                      (9) 
where ݎ takes values around a 1/3 of the sample, following the results of PS. Equation (9) is 
commonly known as the log-t regression. The presence of convergence is tested by way of a 
standard t-statistic and, according to PS, the null hypothesis is rejected whenever this t-
statistic takes values lower than -1.65. If we reject convergence, we can use the PS algorithm 
to consider the existence of clubs2.   
3.2. Results 
In Panel A of Tables 3 and 4, we present the results of the PS statistic to test for the 
convergence hypothesis for the HDI and the per capita GDP, both for the total of the available 
sample and for the period prior to the arrival of the crisis. As one can ascertain, the PS 
statistic rejects the convergence hypothesis for both variables and for the two samples used. 
Hence, there does not seem to be great changes from this perspective and one could reach the 
conclusion that the crisis did not affect the convergence process.  However, we must take into 
account that the convergence statistic is much closer to its critical value when we use the total 
sample. Thus, it is possible that the crisis could have had some kind of effect, which makes it 
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necessary to study the existence of convergence clubs and to analyze them to see if they have 
been modified from 2008 onwards.  
The information presented on Panels B and C from Table 3 informs us of the presence of two 
differentiated clubs in the evolution of the HDI until the year 2007. Both are shown in Figure 
1(a). Club 1 is comprised of 30 provinces; therefore, the remaining 20 are assigned to the 
second group. If we expand the sample to the year 2014, the results change significantly, as 
can be seen on Table 3 and in Figure 1(b). Now there are only 20 provinces that belong to 
Club 1, while the remaining 30 are part of Club 2.  
In order to better understand the behavior of both clubs, we have calculated an index for each 
one, taking the average value of the HDI for each province in Clubs 1 and 2 when the entire 
available sample is used. Figure 2 shows its behavior. We can observe that Club 1 is 
characterized by having, on average, a higher level of HDI throughout the entire sample. With 
regard to the evolution, both clubs maintain an increasing pattern that is only broken in 2012, 
a year in which the growth is negative. But the growth rate is not constant over time. Thus, 
the index for Club 1 shows an average growth of 0.79% until 2007 and 0.25% after that 
period. The values of Club 2 are very similar (0.77% and 0.26% respectively). Thus, we can 
conclude that the distance between both clubs has increased since the second half of the 1990s 
until the beginning of the crisis. The behavior since 2007 is somewhat different. It is true that 
the distance between the two groups has stopped increasing, it has even decreased slightly. 
Nevertheless, we can observe that the distance between the two indexes increases at the end 
of the sample, which could announce a new increase of the divergence as the leading group 
economies recover.  
With regard to the geographic distribution of the clubs, it does not follow a specific pattern. If 
we consider the composition of the clubs until 2007, the different regions include provinces in 
both Club 1 and Club 2, with the exception of the País Vasco and the Comunidad Valenciana, 
where all their provinces are in Club 1.  For the analysis of the entire sample, once again there 
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is no clear geographic pattern and the regions combine provinces which are in both groups, 
with the abovementioned exceptions, to which must be added the case of the Islas Canarias, 
where all of its provinces are in Club 2.  Noteworthy is the fact that GIR is the only province 
of Cataluña that is included in Club 1, clearly showing that the crisis has had a negative effect 
on this important part of the Spanish economy. Likewise, it is worth pointing out the limited 
pull of Madrid, given it is surrounded by provinces that belong to Club 2. In spite of the great 
importance of this province, it is not able to generate enough positive synergies in these 
provinces other than serving as commuters. Lastly, point out that those provinces that include 
the capital of the region are largely included in Club 1, with the exception of Cataluña and the 
Islas Canarias.  
To verify whether the composition of both clubs varies for the two samples being considered, 
we have calculated the statistics of van der Waarden and of Kruskal-Wallis, assigning the 
value i to Club i-ith (i=1,2,…).  These two statistics have the same value, 3.96, and reject that 
the average distribution of the results for both samples is equal. Therefore, we can state that 
there is statistical evidence that the convergence in terms of HDI has been affected by the 
advent of the crisis.  
The analysis of the convergence in terms of per capita GDP is shown on Table 4 and in Figure 
3. The results allow us to reject the convergence hypothesis for the two considered samples. 
But, as it occurs with the HDI, we analyze the possible existence of convergence clubs for 
both time periods. These results are reflected in Panel B of Table 4. If we take the sample 
until 2007, we observe the existence of three highly differentiated clubs with 20, 26 and 4 
provinces in each one. The first group mainly includes most of the northeastern peninsular 
provinces (see Figure 3 (a)) plus the island provinces of SCT and BAL, a unique province of 
Castilla y León (SAL) and three provinces in the south (BAD, MAL and ALM). Club 2 
includes the provinces located in the northwest of the peninsula, in the center of the country, 
the east and the extreme south. In Club 3 we have a province from the north of Spain (LUG) 
and three from the south (CAC, COR and JAE).  
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If we expand the sample to 2014, the results change notably. Now we only have two clubs. 
The first is comprised of the provinces from the País Vasco plus Madrid, while the second is 
made up of the rest of the provinces. If we obtain the statistics from van der Waarden and 
Krukal-Wallis, they take the values of 4.73 and 7.36, respectively. Therefore the hypothesis 
that both distributions are equal is rejected and, again, we have clear evidence that the crisis 
has changed the composition of the clubs.  
To better understand the behavior of the clubs and their trajectories throughout the available 
sample, we have calculated an index that reflects the average value of the per capita GDP for 
each one of the clubs. Figure 4 shows its evolution. As we can see, both indices show 
continuous growth until 2007, after which they decrease by approximately the same rate, 
slightly lower than 19%. Their trajectory runs parallel for many years and the distance hardly 
varies in absolute terms, being around 6,000 € until the middle of the 1990s. After this period, 
the distance increases up to 11,000 € in 2008. This year marks a point of no return and the 
difference decreases to under 9,000 € in 2014, the lowest value since the year 2000. 
Therefore, we see that the crisis has reduced the distance between the two groups, though it 
seems to be due more to the negative effect that it had on per capita GDP than to the efforts of 
the provinces included in Club 2 to reach those of Club 1, as would have been desired. 
  
3.3. Has the crisis especially affected urban provinces? 
Once we have presented evidence that the crisis has affected the convergence process among 
the Spanish provinces, the second question is whether there is a different behavior depending 
on the degree of urbanization of the provinces, as DJISTRA et al., 2015, shows for the 
European case.  
First of all, taking the HDI data, we see that for the 1980-2007 period, Club 1 is comprised of:  
9 PU, 17 INT, 2 PRC and 2 PRR. Therefore, it turns out that the urban provinces are largely 
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included in this club, with the only exception of SCT. The same occurs with the INT 
provinces, with the exception of four provinces of Andalucía (ALM, COR, GRA y HUE) and 
two located in the north of Spain (AST and LEO). In contrast, two PRC (ALB and SOR) and 
two PRR (BAD and OUR) are included in Club 1.  
When the sample is extended to 2014, we have seen that the number of provinces in Club 1 
decrease. But this effect does not severely impact urban provinces, so only the following 
disappear from Club 1: three PU (BAR, MAL and PGC) and six provinces INT (BUR, CAD, 
GUA, MUR, CAN and TAR), although a new one enters (HSC). Likewise, of the four rural 
provinces, only BAD continues and, in addition, another PRC is incorporated (TOL), without 
a doubt benefitting from the capacity of pull of MAD and for being the capital of the Castilla-
La Mancha.   
We see that the PU and the INT provinces, which were largely included in Club 1 until 2007, 
are now evenly divided between both clubs. Similarly, rural provinces are scarcely presented 
in Club 1 now. If we now take the per capita GDP as a reference, the results change. We see 
that from 1980-2007, Club 1 is composed of 20 provinces: 7 PU, 9 INT, 3 PRC and 1 PRR. 
Club 2 is made up of 26 provinces: 3 PU, 13 INT, 4 PRC and 6 PRR. The remaining four 
provinces are in Club 3: only one province INT, 2 PRC provinces and 1 PRR province. It is 
worth pointing out that only by 40% of the INT provinces are included in Club 1. By contrast, 
PU provinces are largely presented in Club 1. Also comment on the relatively high percentage 
of PRC provinces in this club.  
When the sample is extended to 2014, the results are different since only 4 provinces remain 
in Club 1 (3 URB and 1 INT), while the rest go to Club 2. Once again, it is evident that there 
is a negative effect and that many of the provinces initially included in Club 1 disappear when 
considering data after 2007. But it does not seem to be an effect that exclusively applies to PU 
provinces, but rather it clearly extends to the rest.  
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In any case, it seems appropriate to carry out a more in-depth analysis to determine whether 
there are statistically significant differences. To this end, we have proceeded to estimate 
diverse logit models that help us discern which variables are relevant when explaining the 
formation of the clubs previously estimated. Therefore, the dependent variable is dichotomous 
and takes the value 0 if the province belongs to Club 1 and the value 1 if it belongs to Club 2. 
The potential variables that can help us explain why these clubs are formed are many and 
cover diverse aspects of the economic and social activity of a province. In part they are 
limited due to the lack of data. The variables we have used respond to the following 
characteristics of the provinces:   
- Geographical and spatial factors: a possible explanation may come from the existence a 
geographical factor. In order to capture it, we have considered a climate variable, such is 
the number of sunny days (SUN), as is employed in KIM and ROUS, 2012, in order to 
explain the evolution of the housing prices in the USA. 
- Education: this variable has been found to be a very reliable determinant of the urban and 
regional growth, as can be seen in GLAESER and SAIZ, 2004, MORETTI, 2004, 
SHAPIRO, 2006, or GLAESER et al., 2014. To measure education, we have used the 
average of the percentage of the population with higher studies (STUD), as is also 
employed in CRESPO-CUARESMA et al., 2014, or BARTKOWSKA and RIEDL, 2012.  
- Creativity: some recent investigations suggest that economic development is driven in 
large measure by lifestyle factors, such as tolerance and diversity, urban infrastructure and 
entertainment, as suggested by the seminal works of HOWKINS, 2001, and FLORIDA, 
2004. The papers of MARROCU and PACI, 2012, and MARROCU and PACI, 2013, 
provide evidence that the creative class combined with a high level education can lead the 
growth of a particular region or city. Thus, we consider the inclusion of a variable that 
could capture the creativeness of the Spanish provinces in the model. In the absence of a 
measure, we have considered the average number of books per capita (BPC) published in 
the province during the period 1990-2007. 
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- Economic structure: we have employed the percentage of workers of the industrial (ILF) 
and the service sectors (SLF). 
- Tourism sector: this sector is quite important for the Spanish economy, it represents around 
11% of the Spanish GDP. Furthermore, it is considered as a key sector in order to allow the 
Spanish economy to overcome the great recession, given the recent recovery of the sector. 
We have employed the average stay of travelers by province (STAY). 
- Technological Innovation: the relationship between innovation and growth is well known 
since the very important contribution of MCLAURIN, 1953. More recently, MONTAÑÉS 
and OLMOS, 2014, have found that the evolution of the R&D expenditure can help to 
understand the lack of convergence across the Spanish regions. We have used the values of 
the provincial R&D expenditure (measured by its percentage over the provincial GDP) as a 
proxy of the provincial innovation (INNOV). 
- Dummy variables: we have also considered some dummy variables. For those provinces 
which include the capital of the region (DCAP), for those provinces which exhibit an 
insularity condition (DISL), for those provinces that constitute a single-province region 
(DSPR), for those provinces which have a foral3 condition (DFUE) and, finally, a dummy 
for each province class (DPU, DINT, DPR, DPRC, DPRR).  
When selecting the best estimated models, we have followed a strategy from the general to 
the specific, eliminating those initial variables from the model that are not significant. The 
results obtained are shown on Table 5. First of all, we must point out that in the case of HDI 
the relevant variables are the structure of the economy, in particular the weight of the 
industrial sector, and the type of province. Consequently, we conclude that those PU 
provinces with high weight in the industrial sector exhibit a high probability of belonging to 
Club 1. By contrast, a PRR province shows a low probability of being in this club. When we 
consider the whole sample, the estimated model hardly varies. Nevertheless, we can see small 
modifications. For instance, we can see that the DCAP variable is now relevant, clearly 
capturing the influence of the DPU variable, given that they are clearly correlated. In this 
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case, it seems that the services and all activity, not only economic, that surrounds a capital 
city is a plus over the rest of the provinces that make them more prone to be in the group with 
the higher HDI values. Similarly, the fact of being a rural province but close to a PU does not 
have a direct effect on belonging to a specific group, which would bring into question the pull 
capacity of these urban provinces. Furthermore, if we compare the estimated coefficients, we 
see that the probability of a PRR province being in Club 2 is greater. This also happens with 
PU provinces, at least with those that are capitals of a region. Thus, it seems that the crisis has 
increased even further the behavioral dichotomy between these two types of provinces.  
The estimations for the case of per capita GDP are shown on Panel B of Table 5. Before 
going over these results, we must point out that we have eliminated the provinces included in 
Club 34 to make the comparison of the results easier. We see then that the explanatory 
variables of the model are different from the ones used in the HDI case, with the exception of 
the productive structure. On the other hand, it is evident that the type of province does not 
affect the probability of being included in one group or another. Conversely, it is affected by 
the greater degree of technological development of the province (INNOV), the greater weight 
of the service sector (SLF) and, in the opposite case, if it is an island province. Finally, we 
should mention we have not included the estimated model for the whole sample give that a 
single variable, DFUE, is able to almost perfectly discriminate between the two groups.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the convergence process across Spanish provinces, paying 
special attention to the possible effect the crisis could have had on this process. The results 
obtained show that the evolution of the Spanish economy is made up more of clearly 
diverging forces than the sum of the convergent behaviors. In fact, using two different 
indicators, the per capita GDP and the HDI, show the presence of different convergence clubs.  
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In addition, we must point out that the crisis has clearly modified the convergence pattern. 
The composition of the clubs has changed notably, there now remains a smaller number of 
provinces in those clubs with greater indicator values. More specifically, in the case of the 
HDI, there are now 40% less in the leading group than before the crisis, while this dropout 
rate is doubled in the case of the per capita GDP. Therefore, only a smaller group of provinces 
have been able to keep their predominant position. In contrast, only two provinces have 
improved their position and only using the HDI. 
Not only has the composition of the different clubs changed, but we also observe a clear 
effect on its average evolution. It is true that the crisis has allowed the disparity between the 
two clubs to close, especially in the case of the per capita GDP. Since the middle of the 1990s 
this distance had not ceased to increase, therefore, in some way, the crisis has allowed both 
groups to move closer. However, the latest data available suggests that the separation could 
increase over the next few years as the leading provinces recover from the effect of the crisis.  
From a geographic perspective, we have not found great differences in the behavior of the 
provinces. We see that the PU and INT provinces show a similar behavior to the PR provinces 
when considered together. They do, however, differ in regard to the distance from a city. The 
PRR have a lower growth rate during the crisis, while the PRC had a slightly lower growth 
rate than the rest of the provinces. This result is important because the results of DIJKSTRA 
et al., 2015, referring to the group of European regions, does not seem to be valid for the 
Spanish case.   
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1 These data are available at http://www.ivie.es/es/banco/desarrollo_humano.php 
2 See Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) for a description of the use of this algorithm. 
3 Fueros are especial regional laws that provide some fiscal advantages. 
4 We have also considered to join Clubs 2 and 3. These results are not reported given that they are essentially 
similar to those presented in this paper.  
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ALA 24.3 1.9% -3.1% 0.9% 33.5 0.73 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.90 
ALB 9.9 2.7% -2.3% 1.7% 17.7 0.64 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% 0.82 
ALI 13.4 2.1% -2.9% 1.1% 19.6 0.66 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% 0.84 
ALM 9.2 3.8% -3.4% 2.3% 20.3 0.63 0.9% 0.2% 0.7% 0.82 
AST 11.6 2.6% -3.1% 1.4% 19.2 0.68 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.83 
AVI 10.2 2.6% -3.2% 1.4% 16.8 0.66 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.81 
BAD 6.8 3.6% -3.5% 2.1% 14.3 0.60 1.0% 0.3% 0.8% 0.80 
BAR 17.6 2.3% -2.5% 1.3% 27.7 0.71 0.6% 0.2% 0.6% 0.86 
BUR 13.4 2.9% -2.8% 1.7% 24.6 0.70 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.86 
CAC 6.4 3.7% -2.8% 2.4% 14.7 0.62 0.9% 0.2% 0.7% 0.80 
CAD 10.5 2.4% -3.1% 1.3% 16.5 0.64 0.8% 0.3% 0.7% 0.81 
CAN 12.0 2.8% -3.1% 1.6% 20.5 0.69 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.85 
CAS 15.6 2.2% -2.4% 1.3% 24.4 0.67 0.8% 0.3% 0.7% 0.85 
CDR 10.5 2.9% -3.0% 1.7% 18.6 0.63 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% 0.81 
COR 10.2 2.4% -3.0% 1.3% 16.0 0.64 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% 0.81 
CRÑ 12.1 2.5% -3.0% 1.3% 19.2 0.67 0.8% 0.2% 0.6% 0.84 
CUE 10.1 3.0% -3.3% 1.7% 18.1 0.64 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.80 
GIR 18.0 2.5% -2.9% 1.4% 29.5 0.70 0.7% 0.4% 0.6% 0.86 
GRA 8.7 3.0% -3.4% 1.7% 15.6 0.63 0.8% 0.4% 0.7% 0.82 
GUA 12.9 2.7% -2.7% 1.6% 22.7 0.68 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.85 
GUI 17.6 2.5% -3.2% 1.3% 27.9 0.71 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.88 
HLV 11.1 2.3% -2.7% 1.3% 17.5 0.63 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% 0.81 
HSC 14.1 2.7% -3.0% 1.5% 24.0 0.68 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.84 
BAL 13.2 3.2% -2.3% 2.0% 26.7 0.67 0.8% 0.3% 0.7% 0.85 
JAE 9.0 2.6% -2.5% 1.6% 15.5 0.62 0.8% 0.3% 0.7% 0.80 
LEO 10.3 2.9% -2.9% 1.7% 18.5 0.67 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.82 
LLE 16.4 2.6% -2.7% 1.5% 27.7 0.68 0.7% 0.5% 0.6% 0.85 
LUG 10.0 2.6% -2.9% 1.5% 16.9 0.64 0.7% 0.4% 0.7% 0.81 
MAD 16.3 3.0% -2.7% 1.8% 30.7 0.72 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.89 
MAL 9.7 2.9% -3.3% 1.7% 17.3 0.64 0.8% 0.3% 0.7% 0.82 
MUR 12.4 2.4% -2.9% 1.3% 19.5 0.66 0.8% 0.3% 0.7% 0.83 
NAV 17.8 2.3% -2.4% 1.3% 28.2 0.71 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.88 
OUR 7.3 3.6% -2.8% 2.3% 16.3 0.61 0.9% 0.4% 0.8% 0.81 
PAL 14.2 2.3% -3.0% 1.3% 22.0 0.68 0.7% 0.1% 0.6% 0.82 
PGC 12.9 2.4% -2.5% 1.4% 20.8 0.66 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% 0.83 
PON 10.1 2.9% -3.3% 1.7% 17.9 0.65 0.8% 0.3% 0.7% 0.83 
RIO 16.7 2.1% -2.5% 1.2% 25.1 0.69 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.86 
SAL 8.5 3.4% -2.9% 2.1% 17.5 0.67 0.7% 0.4% 0.6% 0.84 
SEG 11.4 3.1% -3.2% 1.8% 21.3 0.68 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.84 
SEV 10.6 2.8% -3.1% 1.6% 18.4 0.64 0.9% 0.3% 0.8% 0.83 
SOR 12.1 2.8% -2.2% 1.8% 22.3 0.69 0.7% 0.4% 0.6% 0.85 
TAR 17.3 2.6% -2.6% 1.5% 29.2 0.68 0.7% 0.4% 0.6% 0.85 
SCT 11.9 2.7% -2.9% 1.5% 20.3 0.67 0.7% 0.4% 0.6% 0.83 
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TER 14.4 2.5% -3.0% 1.4% 23.2 0.67 0.7% 0.1% 0.6% 0.83 
TOL 11.0 2.9% -3.5% 1.6% 19.3 0.65 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% 0.82 
VAL 12.8 2.6% -3.0% 1.5% 21.6 0.67 0.8% 0.3% 0.7% 0.85 
VLD 12.5 2.7% -2.9% 1.6% 21.5 0.70 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.87 
VZC 16.8 2.2% -2.7% 1.2% 25.6 0.70 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.87 
ZAM 7.9 3.2% -3.1% 1.9% 15.5 0.64 0.7% 0.1% 0.6% 0.78 
ZAR 12.8 3.2% -3.1% 1.9% 24.6 0.69 0.7% 0.1% 0.6% 0.86 
This table presents the values for the HDI and the per capita GDP for the Spanish provinces in 1980 and 2014. The growth 
of these variables for the pre-crisis, the post-crisis and the whole periods is also displayed. The per capita GDP is measured 





Table 2. Growth rates for the Spanish provinces. Per capita GDP and HDI. 
 Panel A. Per capita GDP  Panel B. HDI 
 1980-2007 2008-2014 1980-2014 1980-2007 2008-2014 1980-2014 
PU 2.66% -2.90% 1.52% 0.74% 0.25% 0.64% 
INT 2.63% -2.88% 1.50% 0.74% 0.27% 0.65% 
PR 2.91% -2.95% 1.71% 0.76% 0.25% 0.66% 
PRC 2.81% -2.88% 1.64% 0.76% 0.29% 0.66% 
PRR 3.04% -3.03% 1.79% 0.76% 0.22% 0.65% 
This table presents the average growth rates for the different periods of the OECD TL3 Spanish provinces. 
PU: Predominantly Urban; INT: Intermediate; PR: Predominantly Rural; PRC: Predominantly Rural close to 




Table 3. PS methodology. HDI. 






Panel B. Estimated Clubs 
1980-2007 1980-2014 
Club 1 
ALA      BAD      CAS      MAD 
Club 1 
ALA      BAD      CRÑ      GUI      MAD 
Club 2 
ALI      BAL      CRÑ      GIR      GUI      
NAV      SEV 
Club 2 
ALI      BAL      CAS      GIR      HUE      
RIO      NAV      PON      SAL      SEV     
TOL      VAL      VLD      VZC      ZAR 
Club 3 
ALB      BAR      BUR      CAD      GUA    
RIO      MAL      MUR      OUR      PGC     
PON      SAL      CAN      SOR      TAR     
VAL      VLD      VZC      ZAR 
Club 3 
ALB      ALM      AVI      BAR      BUR    
CAC      CAD      CDR      COR      CUE    
GRA      GUA      HSC      JAE      LEO     
LLE      LUG       MAL     MUR      OUR   
AST      PAL      PGC      SCT      CAN     
SEG      SOR      TAR      TER         ZAM 
Club 4 
ALM      AVI      CAC      CDR      COR     
CUE      GRA      HLV      HSC       JAE     
LEO      LLE      LUG      AST      PAL      
SCT      SEG      TER      TOL 


















This table presents the results of applying the Phillips and Sul methodology to the HDI. First, 
Panel A shows the estimation results of the equation (9). Panel B displays the members of each 







Table 4. PS methodology. Per capita GDP. 






Panel B. Estimated Clubs 
2007 2014 
Club 1 
ALA      ALM      BAD      GIR      GUI    
LLE      MAD      TAR 
Club 1 
ALA      GUI      MAD      VZC 
Club 2 
BAL      BAR      BUR      HSC      MAL   
NAV      SAL      SCT      SAN      SEG    
VZC      ZAR 
Club 2 
ALB      ALI      ALM      AVI      BAD    
PMA      BAR      BUR      CAC      CAD   
CAS      CDR      COR      CRÑ      CUE    
GIR      GRA      GUA      HUE      HSC    
JAE      LEO      LLE      RIO      LUG     
MAL      MUR      PAM      OUR    AST   
PAL      PGC      PON      SAL      SCT     
SAN      SEG      SEV      SOR      TAR    
TER      TOL      VAL      VLD      ZAM   
ZAR 
Club 3 
ALB      ALI      AVI      CAD      CAS     
CDR      CUE      GRA      RIO      OUR    
PAL      PGC      PON      SEV      TER     
VAL      VLD      ZAM 
Club 4 
CRÑ      GUA      HUE      LEO      MUR   
AST      SOR      TOL 
Club 5 
CAC      COR      JAE      LUG 
Panel C. Testing for adjacent clubs 
2007 2014 
Clubs 1+2 











This table presents the results of applying the Phillips and Sul methodology to the per capita 
GDP. First, Panel A shows the estimation results of the equation (9). Panel B displays the 





Table 5. Estimation of the logit model. HDI and per capita GDP. 
Panel A. HDI Panel B. Per capita GDP 















 DISL 3.91 
(2.00) 









R2 0.32 0.36 R2 0.31 
Correct Class. 74% 88% Correct Class. 76% 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of the logit model. t-ratios in parentheses. Panel A refers to the 









Figure 1(a). HDI 2007 
 
 
Figure 1(b). HDI 2014 
This figure presents the final classification of the Spanish provinces for the HDI into the estimated Clubs 1 and 2. Figure 
1(a) considers the sample 1980-2007 and Figure 1(b) the sample 1980-2014. 
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Figure 2. Average values of the provinces in Clubs 1 and 2.. HDI 
 












1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Club 1 Club 2
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Figure 3. Estimated clubs. GDP 
 
 




Figure 3(b). GDP 2014 
 
This figure presents the final classification of the Spanish provinces for the per capita GDP into the estimated Clubs 1, 2 




Figure 4. Average values of the provinces in Clubs 1 and 2. Per capita GDP 
 























The data have been obtained from the following sources: 
- Per capita GDP: In order to obtain this variable, we have first joined the different 
database of the provincial GDP, available at the web page of the Spanish Institute of 
Statistics (INE) (www.ine.es). We have transformed in real terms by using the annual 
average of the consumer price index and, finally, we have divided by the population of 
the corresponding provinces. Population and consumer price index are also available 
at the abovementioned web page. The values of the nominal GDP for the 2013-2014 
period have been predicted by using the Spanish nominal GDP. 
- Mean Year of Schooling: These data are available at the IVIE web page 
(http://www.ivie.es/es/banco/caphum/series.php) for the 1980-2013 sample. The data 
for 2014 have been predicted by using the evolution of the percentage of population 
with tertiary studies in Spain.  





Table B1. List of provinces 
Nº Province Acronym Region Class 
Other 
characteristics 
1 Álava ALA País Vasco INT Foral  
2 Albacete ALB Castilla-La Mancha PRC   
3 Alicante ALI Comunidad Valenciana INT   
4 Almería ALM Andalucía INT   
5 Asturias AST Principado de Asturias INT Uniprovincial 
6 Ávila AVI Castilla y León PRR   
7 Badajoz BAD Extremadura PRR   
8 Barcelona BAR Cataluña PU   
9 Burgos BUR Castilla y León INT   
10 Cáceres CAC Extremadura PRR   
11 Cádiz CAD Andalucía INT   
12 Cantabria CAN Cantabria INT Uniprovincial 
13 Castellón CAS Comunidad Valenciana INT   
14 Ciudad real CDR Castilla-La Mancha PRR   
15 Córdoba COR Andalucía INT   
16 Coruña, A CRÑ Galicia INT   
17 Cuenca CUE Castilla-La Mancha PRR   
18 Girona GIR Cataluña INT   
19 Granada GRA Andalucía INT   
20 Guadalajara GUA Castilla-La Mancha INT   
21 Guipúzcoa GUI País Vasco PU Foral   
22 Huelva HLV Andalucía INT   
23 Huesca HSC Aragón PRC   
24 Illes Balears BAL Illes Balears INT 
 Uniprovincial,
insular 
25 Jaén JAE Andalucía PRC   
26 León LEO Castilla y León INT   
27 Lleida LLE Cataluña PRC   
28 Lugo LUG Galicia PRC   
29 Madrid MAD Comunidad de Madrid PU  Uniprovincial
30 Málaga MAL Andalucía PU   
31 Murcia MUR Región de Murcia INT Uniprovincial 
32 Navarra NAV 





33 Ourense OUR Galicia PRC   
34 Palencia PAL Castilla y León PRC   
35 Palmas, Las PGC Canarias PU  Insular 
36 Pontevedra PON Galicia INT   
37 Rioja, La RIO La Rioja INT Uniprovincial 
38 Salamanca SAL Castilla y León INT   
39 Segovia SEG Castilla y León PRC   
40 Sevilla SEV Andalucía PU   
41 Soria SOR Castilla y León PRR   
42 Tarragona TAR Cataluña INT   
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43 Santa Cruz de Tenerife SCT Canarias PU Insular  
44 Teruel TER Aragón PRR   
45 Toledo TOL Castilla-La Mancha PRC   
46 Valencia VAL Comunidad Valenciana PU   
47 Valladolid VLD Castilla y León INT   
48 Vizcaya VZC País Vasco PU Foral   
49 Zamora ZAM Castilla y León PRR   
50 Zaragoza ZAR Aragón PU   
 
 
 
